Will increasing the minimum wage help the poor? by David Neumark et al.
If enacted, the Fair Minimum Wage
Act of 1999 would raise the minimum
wage an additional dollar over the
next two years. But does the mini-
mum wage really benefit the low-
income families it purports to help?
After holding at $3.35 per hour
from 1983 to 1989, the minimum wage
has been raised four times over the past
decade, reaching $5.15 per hour in Sep-
tember 1997. Recently, the Fair Mini-
mum Wage Act of 1999 was introduced
in Congress; if enacted, it would raise
the minimum wage an additional dollar
over the next two years to $6.15.1
According to its proponents, the pri-
mary rationale for increasing the mini-
mum wage is to raise the incomes of
poor and near-poor families with mem-
bers in the workforce. Introducing the
Fair Minimum Wage Act in the U.S.
Senate on January 19, 1999, Senator
Edward Kennedy declared, “I intend to
do all I can to see that the minimum
wage is increased this year. No one
who works for a living should have to
live in poverty.”
It is natural to assume that raising the
minimum wage will help poor families
with working members. Economists’
estimates of the disemployment effects
of minimum wages are usually charac-
terized as small, suggesting that the
main effect of minimum wages is to
raise the earnings of low-wage work-
ers in low-income families. However,
the link between the relatively small
disemployment effects of minimum
wages commonly estimated by econo-
mists, and the effects of minimum
wages on low-wage workers is not as
straightforward as it may seem. Even
more tenuous is the link with incomes
of poor or low-income families. This
Commentary explores these linkages
and describes some new research bear-
ing on the effects of minimum wages on
the poor. 
n n   Employment Effects of 
Minimum Wages
The simple textbook models of the labor
market that are familiar to students of
undergraduate economics imply that if
the government sets a wage floor above
the market-clearing wage for low-skilled
workers, employment of such workers
will be lower than in the absence of the
wage floor. The lower employment
occurs mainly because the increase in
the cost of low-skilled labor, relative to
the cost of using other productive inputs
(such as machinery or more skilled
workers), leads employers away from
using low-skilled labor and toward these
other inputs. This substitution effect is
reinforced by the higher overall cost of
production associated with the legislated
increase in the wage for low-skilled
workers, which in turn raises the price 
of the product and results in less output
sold.
Labor economists have written numer-
ous papers testing this prediction. The
empirical tests typically have focused on
relatively low-skilled workers, for whom
minimum wages are likely to represent a
binding constraint. These tests have had
the common goal of attempting to meas-
ure how the employment of low-skilled
workers changes in response to an
increase in the minimum wage, holding 
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business cycle—that also may influence
the employment levels of this group.2
Earlier studies used time-series data to
study the effects of changes in the
national minimum wage. The consen-
sus of these first-generation studies,
which were completed in the 1970s and
early 1980s, was that a 10 percent
increase in the minimum wage would
reduce the employment of low-skilled
(young) workers between 1 and 2 per-
cent. In the literature, the percent
change in employment divided by 
the percent change in the minimum
wage is referred to as the elasticity of
employment with respect to the mini-
mum wage. Thus, for low-skilled work-
ers the consensus view placed this 
elasticity between –0.1 and –0.2.3
Recent studies have used panel data cov-
ering many states over a period of years
to study the effects of minimum wage
changes at the state level.4 Evidence
from these second-generation studies 
has produced a more diverse set of
results, spurring considerable contro-
versy as to whether minimum wages
actually reduce employment of low-
skilled workers. In a series of papers 
and a recent book, David Card and 
Alan Krueger—leading proponents of
the view that the predictions of the stan-
dard model are wrong—argue that not
only do minimum wages not reduce
employment, they may even increase it.5
On the other hand, much of the recent
evidence using similar sorts of data sup-
ports the textbook prediction that mini-
mum wages reduce employment of low-
skilled workers. Paralleling the earlier
time-series evidence, this research con-
cludes that the elasticity of employment
of low-skilled workers with respect to
the minimum wage falls between –0.1
and –0.2, with estimates for teenagers—
a frequent focus of minimum wage
research—closer to –0.1.6
Because two of the authors of this Com-
mentary are participants in this debate, 
it is perhaps difficult for us to provide 
an objective assessment of the evidence.
However, a leading economics journal
recently published a survey of econo-
mists’ views of the best estimates of 
various economic parameters.7 Results
of this survey, which was conducted in
1996 (after most of the recent research
on minimum wages had become well-
known to economists), indicated that the
median best estimate of the minimum
wage elasticity for teenagers was –0.1,
while the mean estimate was –0.21.
Despite some outlying perspectives,
economists’ views of the effects of the
minimum wage still appear centered in
the range of the earlier consensus. 
n n    Minimum Wages and Poverty
To illustrate the link between minimum
wages and poverty, we have assumed for
this Commentary that the correct esti-
mate of the employment effect is the
median of economists’ current view—
an elasticity of –0.1. This elasticity is
often interpreted as a minor effect of
minimum wages, and hence leads many
policymakers (and many economists) to
conclude that raising minimum wages is
sound public policy. But if raising the
minimum wage reduces employment—
even if the elasticity is small—how can
it help poor and low-income families?
Two questions must be considered to
judge whether the minimum wage,
despite its disemployment effects, will
accomplish this goal.
The first question is whether low-wage
workers, on average, experience higher
earnings as a result of minimum wage
increases. That is, given the disemploy-
ment effects, it will generally be the
case that some workers will be helped
by an increase in the minimum wage
while others will hurt by it. However, it
is much more likely that an increase in
the minimum wage will help the poor if
the total earnings of low-wage workers
as a group rise because of the higher
minimum.
The second question is whether the low-
wage workers benefiting from the mini-
mum wage increase tend to be members
of low-income families (for example,
those below or near the poverty line).
For example, if the job loss from a mini-
mum wage increase is concentrated
among teenagers in relatively affluent
families, while, conversely, the wage
gains from the legislated increase are
concentrated among single-parent heads
of households, then it is considerably
more likely that a minimum wage
increase would help poor and low-
income families. Economists might still
argue whether low-income families
might benefit more from alternatives to
the minimum wage (such as expansion
of the Earned Income Tax Credit), but
policymakers advocating minimum
wage increases would at least be on
secure footing regarding the goals for
their proposal.  
n n    Minimum Wages and 
the Earnings of Low-
Wage Workers
In consideration of the first question,
proponents of minimum wage increases
sometimes make the following argument
in support of a higher minimum: Exist-
ing studies yield an estimate of the elas-
ticity of demand for minimum wage
workers of –0.1. Whereas an elasticity
of –1.0 implies that total earnings of
(initially employed) low-wage workers
would be unaffected by a minimum
wage increase (the implication being
that the employment losses exactly off-
set the earnings gains), a much smaller
elasticity (in absolute value)—such as
–0.1—suggests that income will rise.8
And in the extreme, an elasticity of zero
implies that total income of low-wage
workers would increase by the same per-
centage as the minimum wage.
Unfortunately, this argument is flawed.
The problem is that the –0.1 elasticity
is taken from studies of the employ-
ment effects of minimum wages for
entire age groups and is not equivalent
to—as some have asserted—the elas-
ticity of demand for minimum-wage
workers. Rather, an estimate of the
effect of a minimum wage increase on
total employment in any particular age
group is really the effect on the low-
wage individuals in the group for whom
the new minimum raises wages, aver-
aged over all workers in this age cate-
gory. As high-wage workers are, for the
most part, unaffected by changes in the
minimum wage, the aggregate elasticity
understates the employment effect on
low-wage workers. In addition, many
workers affected by a minimum wage
change do not receive the full amount of
the legislated increase because they werealready earning more than the old mini-
mum wage (although less than the new
minimum). Because the calculation
underlying the –0.1 elasticity is based on
the legislated minimum wage increase
rather than the average increase received
by the affected workers, it overstates the
actual wage increase associated with the
measured change in employment.
Calculating a more relevant measure to
assess the effect of the minimum wage
on low-wage workers’ earnings—the
ratio of the employment decline among
low-wage workers to the wage increase
among this group—requires an adjust-
ment to both the numerator and denomi-
nator of the conventional employment
elasticity. In particular, the numerator
will be adjusted upward in absolute
value to better represent the employment
losses among low-wage workers, while
the denominator will be adjusted down-
ward to reflect the fact that the actual
wage increase for low-wage workers
will be smaller than implied by the legis-
lated change in the minimum wage.
To illustrate these adjustments, consider
the full implementation of the 1996–
1997 minimum wage increase to $5.15
per hour, a 21.2 percent increase. As
table 1 shows, 6.2 percent of workers
aged 16 to 24 were paid a wage exactly
equal to the old minimum wage in 1995,
and another 15.1 percent were paid
wages between the old and new mini-
mums, so that a total of 21.3 percent 
of the youth workforce was directly
affected by the minimum wage increase.
This group should be the focus of esti-
mates of the impact of minimum wage
increases. 
Assuming that everyone in this group
who kept their job saw their wage rise
to exactly $5.15 per hour as a result of
the increase, the average wage increase
received by a worker in this affected
group would be 10.8 percent; thus, the
average wage increase is likely equal 
to about one-half the legislated mini-
mum wage increase. Suppose further
that all of the job loss resulting from 
the minimum wage increase occurred
among these affected workers; the 
percent change in employment for 
this group would be approximately 
five times larger (1/0.213). Using an
elasticity of –0.1 for the age group 
as a whole, the demand elasticity for
young minimum-wage workers would
be close to –1.0, the point at which
minimum wages actually reduce the
total income of low-wage workers.9
This demonstrates that even relatively
favorable estimates of the employment
effects can yield less-than-pleasant 
outcomes—but this is only part of the
answer when the policy is motivated 
by a concern for low-income families.
n n    Minimum Wages and 
Family Incomes
Even with disemployment effects, 
minimum wages might benefit poor
families if the wage gains were con-
centrated among low-wage workers 
in low- income families and the job
losses among low-wage workers in
affluent families. However, this rosy
scenario is only hypothetical. If job
TABLE 1 WAGES OF 16–24-YEAR-OLDS, 1995
Number of workers Percent of  Average percent
Wage (thousands) workforce wage change
Less than $4.25 817 4.3 0
$4.25 1,161 6.2 21.2
$4.26–$5.14 2,850 15.1 6.6
$5.15 or more 14,034 74.4 0
Total 18,862 100.0 2.3
Affected workers 4,011 21.3 10.8
NOTE: Estimates are based on Outgoing Rotation Group files of 1995 CPS. The figures in the fourth
column are based on the assumption that all workers between the old and the new minimum are topped
off to the new minimum. 
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Current Population Survey; and
authors’ calculations.
FIGURE 1 INCOME-TO-NEEDS DENSITY
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Current Population Survey; and
authors’ calculations.FIGURE 2 SUMMARY EFFECTS ON INCOME-TO-NEEDS RATIO
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Current Population Survey; and
authors’ calculations.
losses were concentrated among low-
wage workers in low-income families,
poor families would be especially hurt
by minimum wage increases. Which
families gain from minimum wages?
Economic theory offers little guidance,
as it tells us nothing about how the dis-
employment effects or the earnings
gains of minimum wages are spread
over the income distribution. The only
way to answer this question is to look
directly at the effects of minimum
wages on family incomes.10
In research undertaken over the past 
two years, we have studied this question
using data on family incomes for the
years 1986 to 1995.11 In particular, 
we use data collected for individual
families over two consecutive years,
allowing us to observe transitions into
and out of poverty, or between other
parts of the income distribution.12
Each family is classified in terms of its
income-to-needs ratio (the ratio of total
family income to the poverty line) in
each year. For example, a family with
an income-to-needs ratio of 1.0 is just
at the poverty line ($16,530 in 1998 for
a family of four with two children);
families below this line are classified 
as “poor,” and families with income-
to-needs ratios between 1.0 and 1.5 are
considered “near poor.”  We appended
to each family–year observation the
minimum wage level prevailing in the
state in the year family income was 
measured, as well as the previous year,
since minimum wage effects appear to
take a year or more to fully work their
way through the labor market. Because a
state minimum wage law cannot exempt
employers of workers covered by the
federal law from the federal minimum
wage, and because coverage by the fed-
eral law is nearly complete, we use the
higher of the federal minimum wage 
and the state minimum wage for each
state and year. 
Our basic strategy focuses on the
empirical distribution of family in-
come relative to needs—that is, the
observed proportion of families at 
each value of the income-to-needs
ratio. Figure 1 reports this distribution
for all observations in our data set.13
It exhibits some well-known features:
The right-hand tail becomes quite thin
at high levels of income-to-needs,
reflecting the relatively small number
of families with very high income. 
On the other hand, there is a concen-
tration of families between the poverty
line (where income-to-needs equals
one) and about twice the poverty line. 
To look for minimum wage effects, 
we examine how the income-to-needs
distribution changes when the minimum
wage is raised in a specific state and
year. This requires an experimental
design with a control group of states 
in years when minimum wages did not
rise. We use this control group to pro-
vide a baseline of how the income-to-
needs distribution changes over the
sample period for reasons unrelated to
minimum wage increases. We can then 
estimate the effect of minimum wages
on the income-to-needs distribution 
as the difference between changes in
the distribution for states and years 
with minimum wage increases, and
changes in the distribution for states
and years without minimum wage
TABLE 2 ESTIMATED EFFECTS OF MINIMUM WAGE INCREASES
ON PROPORTIONS IN INCOME-TO-NEEDS RANGES
Income-to-Needs Ratio




of families 0.0005 0.0078 0.0083 0.0046 0.0130 –0.0049 –0.0071 –0.0120
Percent change 0.7 6.6 4.5 3.6 4.1 –3.9 –3.0 –3.4
NOTE: The top panel reports the change in the absolute proportion in the income-to-needs category
implied by the density estimates, and the bottom panel reports the implied percent change in the pro-
portion, relative to the sample mean over all observations.
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Current Population Survey; and
authors’ calculations.increases. For example, if the propor-
tion of families below the poverty 
line (income-to-needs below 1.0) 
rose by 0.02 in states and years with
minimum wage increases, and by 0.01
in the set of states and years without
minimum wage increases, then the esti-
mated effect of raising the minimum
wage on this proportion would be 0.01 
(0.02– 0.01). 
Figure 2 displays the estimated differ-
ence between the income-to-needs 
distributions attributable to minimum
wage increases over the 1986 to 1995
sample period. To better understand 
this figure, suppose that minimum
wages had no effect on the income-
to-needs distribution. In this case, the
figure would display a horizontal line 
at zero because the change in the pro-
portion of families at any level of
income-to-needs would be the same 
in both states and years, regardless of
minimum wage increases. In contrast,
values for the income-to-needs ratio 
that are above the horizontal line at 
zero indicate that the minimum wage 
is estimated to increase the proportion 
of families at this income-to-needs 
level; a negative value points to a nega-
tive minimum wage effect on that part 
of income-to-needs distribution.
What does figure 2 show?  Contrary to
its intended effect, the estimated impact
of an increase in the minimum wage 
is to raise the proportion of families at
the lower end of the income-to-needs
distribution—both below the poverty
line and between 1.0 and 1.5 times the
poverty line. Conversely, our results 
suggest that the minimum wage reduces
the proportion of families with incomes
between 1.5 and three times the poverty
line—families that might be best charac-
terized as “lower-middle-class.”  More-
over, there is essentially no effect on
families above three times the poverty
line, as would be expected because in
such families low-wage workers con-
tribute (at most) a modest share of fam-
ily income. These results are summa-
rized in table 2, which shows the effects
of minimum wages in absolute and per-
centage terms on the proportions of fam-
ilies in various income-to-needs cate-
gories. Expressed as percentages of
families in various income-to-needs cat-
egories, the estimated changes in the
proportions translate into a 4.5 percent
increase in the number of families below
the poverty line, a 4.1 percent increase in
the number of near-poor families, and a
decline of 3.4 percent in the number of
families between 1.5 and three times the
poverty line.14
n n    Conclusion
Legislators who support increasing the
minimum wage believe that this policy
will benefit poor families; however, 
our research indicates that past experi-
ence with minimum wage increases in
the U.S. is at odds with this view. Mini-
mum wages do, no doubt, help some
families escape poverty; but the employ-
ment losses associated with a higher
minimum also appear to cause some
families to fall into poverty. On balance,
our estimates suggest that the latter
effect outweighs the former, and there-
fore the net effect of minimum wages 
is an increase in the proportion of 
poor families. 
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